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Abstract 
 
Macroeconomic fluctuations always are the result of complex interactive processes. For 
this reason, our challenge of the widely used New Keynesian Phillips Curve builds on 
Taylor's (1979) version, which provides room for a richer sequential and interactive structure. 
We show that the Taylor model can be fruitfully complemented by the assumption of a 
‘timeless’ optimizing central bank. The macroeconomic equilibrium exhibits a significant 
degree of inflation inertia which is an endogenous economic result and not merely the 
consequence of exogenous persistence in aggregate real activity. This result is in stark 
contrast to earlier work by Kiley (2002) who found the New Keynesian Phillips curve to show 
more persistent reactions than its Taylor (1979) companion when being exposed to an 
exogenous monetary shocks. 
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Following the seminal paper by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) a vast number of empirical studies 
showed that past inflation is an important and significant variable in explaining current 
inflation. In contrast, theoretical Phillips curve models derived from microeconomic 
principles relate current inflation only to future expected inflation as well as current and/or 
past excess demand but not to past inflation. If one takes such Phillips curve equations as a 
description of an independent economic relationship they tell us that the dynamics of inflation 
is autoregressive only to that degree to which is the excess demand, the main driving force. 
The perspective of taking the Phillips curve independently of its economic 
environment, however, is hardly in line with the real economic world. In reality, aggregate 
supply (as desribed by the Phillips curve) is only one side of the economy which is not 
independent from its counterpart. Workers and capital owners for whose decision-making the 
Phillips curve is the stylized representation, are concerned about and confronted to aggregate 
demand conditions to which they react in an interactive way. In particular, workers and 
capital owners form expectations on future demand in the economy. 
In order to cope with the interactive structure of an economy we try to endogenize 
inflation expectations which are a main variable in modern types of the Phillips curve. As 
economic counterpart we introduce a central bank which minimizes a social loss function 
characterized by the quadratic deviations from zero-inflation and steady-state growth. We 
pursue in that way in order to analyze the endogenous dynamics of inflation. The respective 
procedure, ie., dynamically optimizing the central bank’s social welfare function while taking 
the Phillips curve as the respective constraint, is quite well-known in the monetary policy 
literature. For example, Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2001) used this method to compare 
different monetary policy strategies. 
The purpose of this paper is a slightly different one. Instead of comparing two 
different policy strategies we analyse how the global model economy reacts on a structural 
variation of its supply side. Aggregate supply is most frequently represented by the standard 
New Keynesian Phillips curve (e.g., Gali (2002)) which describes current inflation as a 
function of merely current excess demand and future expected inflation. In contrast, 
Taylor (1979) provides a much simpler alternative. Taylor (1979)’s model is less general and 
only bases on a quasi-microfoundation. This simplicity, however, allows Taylor (1979) to 
abstain from approximations that ignore strategic interactions between individual price setters. 
As a consequence, Taylor (1979) provides a somewhat richer inflation dynamic than the 
standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. More precisely, in Taylor (1979) inflation depends 
also on past excess demand, not only on the current one and inflation expectations. 
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This seemingly small difference is of great consequence. A deviation of output from 
steady-state does not only alter current inflation but also causes disinflation in the next period 
to be costly. In addition, this future consequence is even anticipated in present time as being 
described by inflation expectations as explanatory variable. Therefore, we expect that this 
seemingly small modification by Taylor (1979) is important in an interactive perspective with 
endogenous central bank behavior. 
Whereas the difference between the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve and the 
Taylor (1979) model already has been studied in respect to exogenous monetary 
shocks (Kiley 2002) we analyse the two different Phillips curve settings in a model economy 
with endogenous monetary policy. In this case of endogenous policy individuals, represented 
by either of the Phillips curves, anticipate that the central bank will minimize the social loss 
from inflation and unemployment in an intertemporal perspective. In other words, they do not 
merely react on exogenous events. We can show that, in contrast to Kiley (2002)’s work, the 
Taylor (1979) model turns out to endogenously produce more inflation inertia than the New 
Keynesian pendent. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section the two 
different versions of the Phillips curve are derived. The methodology will be explained in 
section 3 and applied to the two alternatives in sections 4 and 5. In section 6 the results are 
simulated and visualized. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Models of Aggregate Supply 
In the following section we derive the two slightly different types of Phillips curves 
from microeconomic principles. First, we describe the widely used New Keynesian Phillips 
curve. As we are interested in inflation dynamics, we concentrate on the price setting 
mechanism and leave out other aspects of decision-making. Secondly, we provide intuition 
for the Taylor (1979) type of nominal dynamics. 
 
2.1 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve 
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve is based on Calvo’s (1983) model of partial price 
adjustment. Calvo (1983) assumes that firms adjust their prices infrequently. Furthermore, he 
assumes that opportunities to do so arrive according to an exogenous Poisson process where 
(1-ω) is the constant probability that a firm can adjust prices in the current period. 
 2
Rotemberg (1987) claims that representative firms i try to minimize the intertemporal 
sum of squared deviations of their (fixed) prices to the profit maximizing prices of the 
respective period. He shows that firms set prices according to 
 
( )∑∞
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+−=
0
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j
jtt
jj
t pEx βωβω     (1) 
 
where xt is the price that is optimal for the adjusting firms, β is the discount factor 
representing time preference, ω the firm’s probability of currently being inhibited from 
adjusting prices, and Etp*t+j is the current expectation of the j period’s ahead price level which 
would be profit-maximizing in the absence of any restrictions. Equation (1) describes the 
adjusted prices to be a weightened average of the current and future expected target 
prices p*t+j. The currently adjusting firms’ optimal price xt can be rewritten as weightened 
average of the current target prices p*t and the expected optimal price of the following 
period’s adjusting firms’, Etxt+1, 
 
( ) 1*1 ++−= tttt xEpx ωββω .     (1’) 
 
Assuming that the target price level  p*t depends on current output yt as well as on the current 
aggregate price level  pt, equation (1’) can be replaced by 
 
   ( )( ) 11 ++++−= tttttt xEpyx ωβνγβω     (1’’) 
 
where γ is a positive constant coefficient, depending on the goods’ price elasticities of 
demand, and νt catches influences on pricing other than price level and aggregate demand. 
Hereby, νt=ρ νt-1 + εt is a stable first order stochastic process. 
The dynamics of the aggregate price level, in turn, can approximately be described by 
 
  ( ) 11 −+−= ttt pxp ωω .     (2) 
 
if the number of firms is sufficiently large. 
The equations (1’’) and (2) can be reformulated and combined to describe the inflation 
dynamics of the model. If we take equation (2) and its one period’s ahead expectations to 
eliminate xt and Etxt+1 from equation (1’’) we receive 
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which can be rewritten as 
 
   ( )( ) ( ttttt yE νγω )
βωωπβπ +−−+= + 111     (3’) 
 
as πt=pt-pt-1 . Simplifying notation, we get 
 
ttttt ukyE ++= + 21πβπ       (3’’) 
 
where 2kyt is intended to represent the current demand side effects3 and ut=ρ ut-1 + εt all other, 
mainly the current supply side or cost push effects on inflation dynamics. 
The derivation of this Calvo (1983) type of Phillips curve is based on critical 
assumptions. Especially equation (2) is an appropriate approximation of aggregate price 
dynamics only if excess demand varies just moderately and if the number of firms is large, i.e, 
if price setting of a single firm does not influence the aggregate price level and specific 
demand for another firm’s good to a significant extend. If this is not the case the derived 
inflation dynamics lack of important strategic interaction effects. Furthermore, it is disputable 
to assume that the target price level, p*t depends on the actual price level, pt, as the latter 
refers to an economy with pricing restrictions, the latter to one without restrictions. This 
assumption is necessary to receive (1’’) from (1’). In any case, however, one has to think 
about eliminating the aggregate price level in equation (1’’) by iteratively inserting the current 
and than lagged versions of equation (2). This procedure shows that price adjustment also 
depends on past values of excess demand. Altogether we see that, due to the sequential 
structure of the price setting process, the influence of past values on aggregate inflation is in 
line with the potential strategic effects mentioned above. 
As Calvo’s (1983) partial adjustment model can be solved only with approximations 
potentially disregarding strategic interaction effects we suggest to additionally analyse the 
                                                 
3 In contrast to standard notation the effects of excess demand are normalized to 2kyt instead of kyt. This notation 
is comparable to the one of the Taylor (1979) model where k(yt+yt-1) represents demand side effects on 
inflation. 
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earlier and more simple Taylor (1979) model which does not compel to use approximation 
methods. 
 
2.2 The Taylor (1979) Model 
Instead of partial price adjustment, the Taylor (1979) model relies on the idea of an 
economy where two (types of) firms set alternately their prices. The sequential structure of the 
pricing decisions is deterministic. Firms set prices pt in the way so that they cover the average 
of the contract wages xt4 which are valid at the stage plus a mark-up µt  
 
  ( ) tttt xxp µ++= −121        (4) 
 
where variables represent log values and, for simplicity, the mark-up is set to µt=0. 
Workers orientate their wage aspiration on the current state of the business cycle, yt. 
As the expected real wage during the nominal wages contract period is ½[(xt-pt)+(xt-Etpt+1)] 
unions set nominal wages according to 
 
  ( ) ttttt ypEpx δ++= +121       (5) 
 
where δ is the wage elasticity of aggregate demand. 
Inserting the wage setting equation (5) in the (simplified) price equation (4) we get 
 
  121214114114141 −+− +++++= tttttttt yyppEppp δδ .   (6) 
 
Subtracting (¾ pt + ¼ pt-1) from equation (6), deviding the result by ¼, and noting that 
πt=pt-pt-1 , we get 
 
   ( )11 2 −+ ++= ttttt yyE δππ       (6’) 
 
To make equation (6’) comparable to equation (3’’) we discount the variables of the former to 
present time, simplify by taking 2δ=k, and add ut to represent cost push effects on inflation 
                                                 
4 In the Taylor (1979) model xt represents the optimal nominal wage to be set by the workers or a union, 
repectively, whereas in the Calvo (1983) model it stands for the optimal price to set by the firm(s) in charge. 
As nominal wages in the former and nominal prices in the latter model are the respective microeconomic key 
variable, it is – in our case - not unprecise but economically appropriate to use the same label for them. In 
doing so, we are in line with standard notation. 
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         (6’’) tttttt ukykyE +++= −−+ 111 βπβπ
 
where ut=ρ ut-1 + εt, again, is a stable autoregressive process. The staggered price type of 
Phillips curve according to Taylor (1979) has a structure similar to the partial price 
adjustment one which follows from Calvo (1983). 
 
3. Aggregate Demand: Optimal Central Bank Policy 
As argued above, from our point of view it is not sufficient to appraise the two derived 
types of Phillips curve independently from demand side conditions. Aggregate demand is not 
given exogenously but depends on aggregate supply which we describe by the Phillips curve. 
Therefore we will evaluate the two derived types of Phillips curves by confronting them to 
aggregate demand which is governed by the central bank. 
In line with the general course of action in the monetary policy literature we assume 
that the central bank minimizes a social loss function lt which depends on inflation πt and 
output yt as nominal and real variable, respectively: 
 
( )2221 ttt yl απ +=       (7) 
 
The social loss is weightened sum of the squared deviation of (current) inflation πt from price 
stability, πt=0, and output yt from its steady-state path where α is a positive coefficient. We 
assume that the central bank is perfectly able to control the aggregate output level  yt by its 
policy instruments while we, as usual, abstain from modelling the transmission process 
explicitly. Hereby, we also abstract from possible problems of the adoption of policy 
instruments. 
Although most central banks are not exposed to directly binding restrictions in the 
conduct of their future monetary policy (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999, p. 1971) we claim 
that the central bank does not pursue a discretionary policy. In contrast, we propose that the 
central bank adopts a policy strategy which is optimal over an infinite horizon. Moreover, we 
assume the central bank to take even a timeless perspective5, i.e., to operate in a way that is 
not only optimal in respect to the future but also from the past point of view. This means that 
the central bank does not take individuals’ price or wage setting decisions as given but 
punishes them if they did not adapt to its course of macroeconomic stabilization. In other 
                                                 
5 For details on the ‚timeless perspective’, see Jensen and McCallum, 2002. 
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words, the monetary authority pursues its strategy of intertemporally minimizing social loss 
as if it was already credible in previous periods. 6
 
Speaking in formal terms, the central bank will dynamically optimize its loss function 
subject to the respective Phillips curve being the constraint.7 Using Lagrangian, we get 
 
  ( )[ ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ ++−= ∑
∞
=0
22
2
1
t
tttt
t
t FyEL φαπβ ]     (8) 
 
where ½фt is the multiplier associated with the constraint at time t and Ft represents 
equation (3’’) or (6’’), respectively. Differentiating the Lagrangian to πt and yt and setting the 
results equal to zero, yields the optimal conditions. As will be shown in the next section the 
differentiation with respect to πt provides different results for t=0 and t>0. This is the case 
because the expectations of present inflation, Et-1πt, have already been determined one period 
ago and, therefore are cancelled out when differentiating in respect to t=0. As the central bank 
is assumed to adopt a timeless perspective only the conditions for t>0 are applied and the 
results for t=0 are ignored. 
 
4. Endogenous Inflation in a New Keynesian World 
In this section we use the method described above and apply it to the case of the 
standard New Keynesian Phillips curve. With the Lagrangian being 
 
( ) ([ ]⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −−−++−= ∑
∞
=
+
0
1
22
2
1 2
t
ttttttt
t
t ukyyEL βππφαπβ )    (8’) 
 
the first order conditions result in 
 
   0,21 =∀−= ttt φπ    (9.1) 
 
   0,,12121 >∀+−= − tttt φφπ    (9.2) 
 
                                                 
6 For related problems of credibility and their possible solution, see, e.g., Walsh (2003), Chapter. 8. 
7 For methodological issues, see Currie and Levine (1993) and Woodford (1999). 
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   0, ≥∀= tky tt φα    (9.3) 
 
Combining the first order conditions to eliminate the multiplier фt, we receive the conditions 
for the central bank’s optimal policy 
 
   0,21 =∀−= tyk tt
απ             (10.1) 
 
  0,12121 >∀+−= − tykyk ttt
ααπ             (10.2) 
 
As the central bank is conducting its monetary policy in a ‘timeless’ perspective, it will ignore 
the present time condition and act according to equation (10.2) from the very beginning. By 
rewriting as 
 
   tt
ky πα
2−=∆                 (10.2’) 
 
one can see that a ‘timeless’ central bank maximizes its welfare by increasing the output gap 
proportionally to current inflation. Hereby, the policy reaction will be the stronger the more 
effective a reduction in aggregate demand is for the reduction of inflation and the weaker the 
social preferences for real output are. 
Inserting the optimal policy condition (10.2) into the Phillips curve yields a stochastic 
difference equation for yt which describes the time path of excess demand as an endogenous 
policy result 
 
  t
C
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C
t ub
kyE
b
y
b
y −+= +− 11 22
αβα      (11) 
 
where bc≡½α(1+β)+2k2. The stable solution of (11) is 
 
   tCtCt uyy 211 ηη += −        (12) 
 
with 
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as ηC1 є (0,1). This result, in turn, can be combined with the optimality condition (10.2) which 
yields the endogenous inflation dynamics, resulting from the interactions on the 
macroeconomic level 
 
   ( 1211 2 −− −−= ttCtCt uukη )
απηπ      (13) 
or 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
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Thus, in a New Keynesian world inflation turns out to be a stable AR(1)-process with an 
increase in the cost pressure, i.e., ∆ut>0, driving current inflation upwards (as ηC2<0). 
 
5. Endogenous Inflation in a Taylor-Type Economy 
After having derived the endogenous results for the New Keynesian benchmark, we 
proceede in the same way for an economy in which prices are set in line with Taylor (1979). 
From the modified Lagrangian 
  
( ) ( )[ ]⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −−−−++−= ∑
∞
=
−+
0
11
22
2
1
t
tttttttt
t
t ukykyyEL βππφαπβ   (14) 
 
the first order conditions are derived which are the same for 0=∂
∂
t
L
π  as in the New 
Keynesian economy 
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   0,21 =∀−= ttt φπ             (15.1) 
 
   0,,12121 >∀+−= − tttt φφπ             (15.2) 
 
but differ for 0=∂
∂
ty
L  
 
   0,
22 1
≥∀+= + tkky ttt φαφα              (15.3) 
 
Concentrating on the relevant case of a ‘timeless’ monetary policy strategy, we get the 
optimal condition 
 
  ( ) 0,,12121121 >∀+−=+ −+ tykykE ttttt
ααππ              (16) 
or 
   ( 1++−=∆ tttt Eky ππα )      (16’) 
 
Compared to the New Keynesian benchmark case (equation 10.2’), an optimally working 
central bank will react on average half a period earlier on inflation (and even process inflation 
expectations) when it is confronted with Taylor-type price setters (equation 16’). 
By inserting the optimal policy condition (16) into the aggregate supply equation 
following from Taylor (1979), we, again, get a stochastic difference equation describing the 
endogenous time path for yt  
 
  t
T
tt
T
tt
T
t
T
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11
2
1
21 αββα   (17) 
 
where bT≡α(1+β)+k2β-1(1+β) and Etut+1=ρut. For appropriate parameter8 values the 
difference equation (17) yields a single stable solution which is 
 
                                                 
8 For a time discount factor β = 0,96 (assumed contract lenght: 1 year)  ηT1 є (0; 1) if k є (0,144; 0,939). If the 
central bank has no time preference, β = 1, there is always a single and stable solution for all positiv values 
of k, however, ηT1 > 0 only for k < 1. 
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   tTtTt uyy 211 ηη += −        (18) 
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To determine the endogenous dynamics of inflation, we substitute out yt from (18) by 
inserting the optimal policy (16), and we receive 
 
   ( ) ( 2122111 1 −−−− −−+−= ttTtTtTt uuk η )
απηπηπ .   (19) 
 
In the Taylor (1979) world the endogenous time path of inflation depends on lagged inflation 
and the previous period’s change in cost push pressure. For (ηT1-1)<0 the previous period’s 
inflation has a deflationary influence on the current period but increases inflation, again, 
another period later. An increase in the cost pressure fuels inflation with a lag of one period. 
In contrast, in the New Keynesian world (equation 13) lagged inflation increases current 
inflation and only in the next period; the inflationary effect of an increase in cost pressure 
occurs without delay. 
The mentioned results are surprising at first glance. As an optimally operating central 
bank in a Taylor (1979) economy (equation 16’) is partly forward-looking and fights inflation 
on average half a period earlier than in a New Keynesian economy (equation 10.2’) one might 
expect that endogenous inflation depends on shorter lags in the former case. Equations (13) 
and (19), however, show the opposite. As a central bank in the Taylor (1979) economy knows 
that a current reduction in excess demand reduces inflation also in the following period, it will 
apply its policy instruments in a more careful and temporarily extended way than a central 
 11
bank in a New Keynesian economy. In the latter environment aggregate demand directly 
influences inflation only in the current period. In both cases the policy effects are reinforced 
by the forward-looking behavior of the price or wage setters. Clear predictions, however, are 
hard to derive from the analytical solution which depends on a bundle of parameters. This fact 
reflects the high complexity of a macroeconomic system in which a forward-looking central 
bank interacts with forward-looking agents in an economy with overlapping contracts. 
Therefore, in the next section the results are simulated for a broad range of parameter values. 
 
6. Simulation Results 
In this section we will conduct impulse response exercises to get a more precise idea 
how output and inflation evolve endogenously in reaction to a cost push shock of size 1% of 
its equilibrium value. Thereby, we proceed in the following way: First, we explain the 
simulation exercise and describe the results for the Taylor (1979) economy. Secondly, we 
compare the results to that of a New Keynesian economy and give some explanations for the 
observed differences. Thirdly, we briefly refer to variations in the parameters in order to show 
that the obtained results are robust for a broad parameter range. 
Starting point of the simulation is an economy in equilibrium9 and in absence of 
shocks. In period 1 the cost push term is increase by 1% over its equilibrium value. The 
values for inflation and excess demand are computed for the next 10 periods by using the 
respective solutions for the endogenous time path: 
 
Taylor economy:  tTtTt uyy 211 ηη += −       (18) 
    ( ) ( ) *2122111 1~ πηαπηπηπ −+−−+−= −−−− ttTtTtTt uuk  (19’) 
    ( )1int ~ −+−= tttt yykππ      (19’’) 
 
New Keynesian economy: tCtCt uyy 211 ηη += −       (12) 
    ( 1211 2 −− −−= ttCtCt uukη )
απηπ     (13) 
          (19’’) ttt ky2
int −= ππ
 
                                                 
9 I.e., log-values of inflation and excess demand are zero. 
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where is the intrinsic inflation, i.e., this fraction of inflation that is due to intrinsic 
inflation persistence and not merely caused by excess demand or a cost push shock. 
int
tπ
A special issue is endogenous inflation in the Taylor (1979) economy (equation 19). In 
this particular case the analytically precise inflation dynamics are dominated by a cycling 
pattern. This cycling effect is due to the overlapping structure of the Taylor (1979) model and 
the only stylized microfoundations of its agents (equation 4 and 5). In order to stress the 
medium term business cycle aspects of the model economy the somewhat artificial cycling 
component is removed. This smoothing procedure is done by subtracting the steady-state 
amplitude of the cycling component, *π . 
As standard setting we fix the relevant parameters as follows: The central bank’s 
relative preference for aggregate output compared to price stability is 1=α . The discount 
factor evaluating time preference is 96.0=β , therefore, the corresponding rate of time 
preference is 4% per period. The responsiveness coefficient of inflation on excess demand 
which inversely reflects the market power of the price or wage setters is . Finally, the 
cost push shock is assumed not to show autocorrelation, 
5.0=k
0=ρ , in the standard case. 
Black lines show the time path of output, purple lines describe the dynamics of 
inflation or smoothed inflation, respectively, whereas orange lines represent the purely 
intrinsic inflation. Solid lines are the endogenous outcome of the Taylor economy, dashed 
lines refer to the New Keynesian world. 
As we see in figure 1, in the Taylor (1979) world the central bank immediately fights 
against the inflationary pressure of the cost push shock taking place in period 1. This is done 
by the reduction of aggregate output, i.e., by creating an output gap. This output gap is 
smoothly reduced in the subsequent periods and, provided that there is no further supply side 
shock, converges to its steady-state. Smoothed inflation is increased as a consequence of the 
initial cost push . However, this effect is partially offset by the lack of aggregate demand as 
intended by the monetary authority. Due to the sluggish influence of excess demand on 
production the initial rise of prices is reverted to deflation before the state of price stability is 
approached again. Intrinsic inflation which is driven by future inflation expectations is pushed 
to its negative range as a deflationary policy reaction on the cost push is correctly anticipated 
by price setters. From then on also intrinsic inflation converges back to its equilibrium path. 
Output gap and (negative) intrinsic inflation have influence on smoothed inflation to a 
comparable degree. 
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Figure 1: Impuls Response to u(t=1)=1; Taylor (1979) Model :   k=0,5   rho=0. 
 
Figure 2 shows that in the New Keynesian world the endogenous reactions of output 
and inflation on the cost push shock are similar to that of the Taylor (1979) economy. Only 
the amplitude of inflation seems to be smaller in the New Keynesian case. For details, 
however, let us directly compare the respective variables. 
Figure 3 shows how the central bank reduces output in response to a cost push shock. 
The policy action is clearly stronger in the New Keynesian case. This in line with our 
predictions. A Taylor (1979) world central bank more carefully reduces excess demand 
knowing that this reduction will have the same inflation reducing effects in the next as in the 
current period. 
Inflation dynamics has a similar structure in both type of economies as figure 4 shows. 
In the Taylor (1979) economy, however, the central bank leaves more room to shift the cost 
push shock into prices. Consequently, deflation in the subsequent period has a somewhat 
minor extend. The results for inflation are in line with what we have learned about the 
different output dynamics of both economies. 
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Figure 2: Impulse Response to u(t=1)=1; Taylor/New Keynesian PC:     k=0,5; rho=0. 
 
Figure 3: Response of Output to u(t=1)=1; Taylor/New Keynesian PC:     k=0,5; rho=0. 
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Figure 4: Response of Inflation to u(t=1)=1; Taylor/New Keynesian PC:     k=0,5; rho=0. 
 
Figure 5: Response of Intrinsic Inflation to u(t=1)=1; Taylor/New Keynesian PC. 
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 So, are differences in inflation dynamics only the direct result of different output 
reactions in the two economies? Figure 5 shows that in both economies intrinsic inflation, 
being neither due to excess demand nor cost push but solely being driven by expectations, 
increases in a similar way when a cost push shock occured. In contrast, intrinsic inflation 
converges more smoothly back to equilibrium in the New Keynesian world. To better 
understand this fact we will consider the autocorrelation of intrinsic inflation. 
Figure 6 shows the autoregressive coefficients of intrinsic inflation. The blue columns 
represent the New Keynesian economy, the yellow ones are the results in the Taylor (1979) 
world. We find that autoregression of intrinsic inflation is higher in the Taylor (1979) world, 
even if only to a small but constant extend. The only exception of this fact we find in period 2. 
Here, the Taylor (1979) economy shows by far a much smaller degree of autoregression than 
the New Keynesian economy,  even a smaller than oneself in the following periods. This 
effect can be explained by the additional output lag in the Taylor (1979) type Phillips curve. 
Price setters know that the reduction in excess demand, pursued to fight cost push inflation, 
will dampen prices also in the second but not anymore in the third period. Consequently, 
inflation expectations are already reduced in period 2. One can resume that the Taylor (1979) 
type Phillips curve, due to its extra lag, is one period in delay in getting the turn-around back 
to equilibrium. 
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Figure 6: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=1,   β=0,96,   k=0,5,   ρ=0. 
 
But is what we observe in figure 6 a general result? In order to see whether the finding 
that the Taylor (1979) economy experiences a higher degree of intrinsic inflation persistence 
might only be due to the specific parameterization we vary each of the main four parameters 
(α=0.5, α=2; β=0.94, β=0,98; k=0.2, k=0.8; ρ=0.5). Thereby, we keep the other three 
parameters constant. As result we see that the levels vary in the parameters, however, the 
structure of the endogenous dynamics mainly remains unchanges. For the sake of clarity we 
refer to the Appendix where we have moved to the respective figures. 
One major exception from finding qualitatively unchanged results is the case of a time 
preference parameter of 98,0=β . Figure 7 shows that when time preference is low 
autoregression is little higher in the New Keynesian than in the Taylor (1979) case. As 
individuals with low time preference evaluate future events lower than present or even past 
ones, the lagged output term of the Taylor type Phillips curve receives a higher weight. This 
might be the reason why in the presence of low time preference a Taylor (1979) economy 
converges especially fast to equilibrium. 
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Figure 7: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=1,   β=0,98,   k=0,5,   ρ=0. 
 
Remarkable is also the endogenous outcome for an autocorrelated cost push 
shock (ρ=0.5). Figure 8 exhibits that the autocorrelation coefficient of intrinsic inflation is not 
constant over time. It is high directly after the occurrence of the cost push shock and then 
converges to the value of its shock autocorrelation. The latter, however, does not prevent a 
Taylor (1979) economy from experiencing higher inflation persistence than the New 
Keynesian one. 
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Figure 8: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=1,   β=0,96,   k=0,5,   ρ=0.5. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
Nominal as well as real macroeconomic fluctuations are always the result of complex 
interactive processes. For this reason we challenged the widely used New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve by incorporating into our model the (seemingly more simple) version developed by 
Taylor (1979). The simpler approach, however, proved to provide more room for a richer 
sequential and interactive structure. Exposing the Taylor (1979) model to a timeless 
optimizing central bank, we are able to reproduce a significant degree of inflation inertia 
which is endogenous in the spirit of an interactive economy and not merely the consequence 
of exogenous persistence in real output.  
We pursued our analysis in the perspective of an endogenous economic system. 
Thereby, we amended earlier work by Kiley (2002) who also considered the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve and its Taylor (1979) companion. In contrast to our approach, Kiley (2002) 
represented the economy’s demand side by exogenous monetary shocks which, of course, do 
not depend on price and wage setters’ behavior. Thus, in his approach inflation is a direct 
response to exogenous shocks, whereas in our case the path of inflation is determined by a 
goal-oriented central bank which tries to offset undesirable exogenous shocks. Insofar, it is 
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not surprising that Kiley (2002) finds the New Keynesian Phillips curve to create more 
inflation persistence than the Taylor (1979) model, whereas we – for most parameters values 
– came to the opposite result.  
A better knowledge about causes and characteristics of inflation persistence is 
necessary for a precise, target-oriented monetary policy. Therefore, we carried out simulations 
to disentangle cost push, aggregate demand and inflation expectations as distinct sources of 
inflation inertia and to get an impression of their relative importance. The major insight from 
our model, however, is more general: Strategic interaction, prevalent between the central bank 
and price setters as well as among price setters, is a major candidate to explain intrinsic 
inflation persistence. 
 21
Appendix: 
Figure 9: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=0.5,   β=0,96,   k=0,5,   ρ=0. 
Figure 10: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=2,   β=0,96,   k=0,5,   ρ=0. 
 
 22
Figure 11: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=1,   β=0,94,   k=0,5,   ρ=0. 
Figure 12: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=1,   β=0,96,   k=0,2,   ρ=0. 
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Figure 13: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=1,   β=0,96,   k=0,8,   ρ=0. 
Figure 14: Autoregression of Intrinsic Inflation     -     α=1,   β=0,96,   k=0,5,   ρ=0.5. 
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